# The "Human Factor" in data and device protection.

•••

Case study, hacking history and best practices

Carlo Gubitosa - carlo@gubi.it


# Case study

One innocent typo can wipe your device

In this example which occurred to me personally, we'll examine one case in which a careless setup of a Gmail account can compromise all the mobile devices linked to that account.


# Alert

An alert on a legitimate email address comes from a similar email address. Somebody is trying to pretend to be me? My address is set as "recovery address" for the same email with a "1" in the end.




# Takeover

I recover the password using the recover address name.surname@gmail.com and takeover the modified account name.surname1@gmail.com




# Get password

I get a recovery mail that opens you the door of the account name.surname1@gmail.com



## Control

Checking the account it seems clean, just created, no mail sent, no suspect of fraudulent activity that may be associated to an identity theft attempt. We check the details of the connections.



## Trace

From the details of your account you can see the history of connections to the account, with the IP and the type of device used.




\* indica le attività della sessione corrente.

Questo computer utilizza l'indirizzo IP 93.45.


# Locate

Using the IP address connection history you can geolocate the device who set up that account




# Personal info

The profile of google account contains personal information, including geolocation. We see that the account was linked to two different e-mail addresses, which differs by only one digit.



# Lock out

After changing the mobile phone number associated to the account, the creator has no more means to get in. You can lock, wipe and make ring the mobile device linked to the account.



# Hijack

With the "lock" feature you can even "hijack" the remote device which will display a message and the option to call just one specific phone number.

#### Nuova schermata di blocco

L'attuale schermata di blocco verrà sostituita con un blocco tramite password. Non utilizzare la password del tuo account Google.

Nuova password
Conferma password
Messaggio per il ripristino (opzionale)
Questo messaggio verrà visualizzato nella schermata di blocco.
Numero di telefono (facoltativo)
Nella schermata di blocco troverai un pulsante per chiamare il num

Mar Mediterran

Annulla


Blocca

## Remove device

You can contact the person which tried to link his email account to yours to verify its intentions explaining that s/he gave you lock and wipe control on his device.

#### Dispositivi utilizzati di recente

I dispositivi che sono stati attivi sul tuo account negli ultimi 28 giorni o con cui hai eseguito l'accesso di recente. Ulteriori informazioni



# Case study: Lessons to learn

## Cyber-darwinism: the most fit species will survive

A careless typo on the recovery email address when creating your account, with no awareness of the possible consequences.

The digital identity dies

(Even if is protected by passwords, SSH encryption, two-step authentication.

Technology is nothing without knowledge)

Attention, awareness, knowledge and intention to exploit information received by mistake.

The digital identity lives

(And prevails to weaker digital identities)

# We should trust our knowledge more than technologies

The human factor is the weakest point of the IT security chain

#### Dos and don'ts

Weak passwords which contains your name, your year of birth or other personal information.

Strong passwords, but easy to remember. (e.g. join your favourite drinks for 7UP.whisky2malt)

Password written on paper bites

Password manager (Keepass or others)

Smartphone without a pin

Encrypted and protected smartphone

Skip software and OS updates

Do regular housekeeping of your devices

Click and type with no idea of what you're doing

Be aware of what you are doing

Keys left in the main door of your house


Keep your house locked and safe.

### Common scam schemes lists:


https://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud/ internet\_fraud/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ List of confidence tricks Who should have control over your data?

Who should be able to enter in your home?



IF WE OPEN
OUR DEVICES
TO 3RD
PARTIES,
THEIR
CONTENT
COULD BE
ACCESSED
BY...



# People don't care

The most popular passwords of 2015

#### The 25 Most Popular Passwords of 2015: We're All **Such Idiots**









It's 2016 and you may have thought we'd all be a little older and wiser than this time last year. But as you read this list of 2015's most popular passwords, you will shake your head, mumble unmentionables and reach the firm conclusion that, no, we are in fact all still complete and utter morons.

Every year, SplashData complies a list of the millions of stolen passwords made public throughout the last twelve months, then sorts them in order of popularity. This year the results, based on a total of over 2 million leaked passwords, are not the list of random alpha-numeric characters you might hope for. Rather, they're a lesson in exactly how not to choose a password.

Yes, "123456" and "password" remain bewilderingly popular.

# People don't care

The most popular passwords of 2015

```
1. 123456 (Unchanged)
```

2. password (Unchanged)

3. 12345678 (Up 1)

4. qwerty (Up 1)

5. 12345 (Down 2)

6. 123456789 (Unchanged)

7. football (Up 3)


8. 1234 (Down 1)

9. 1234567 (Up 2)

10. baseball (Down 2)

# People don't care

Some examples which I could document personally



# Outdated and Vulnerable WordPress, Drupal Versions Contributed To Panama Papers Breach





Д

Posted by **BeauHD** on Wednesday April 06, 2016 @08:28PM from the contributing-factors dept.

# Admins don't care

"You pay as I want,
I work as you say.
You pay as you say,
I work as I want".

#### **CORRIERE DELLA SERA** / CRONACHE



PANAMA PAPERS

# Alla Mossack Fonseca sarebbero bastati 6 euro per fermare gli hacker



Una somma irrisoria che avrebbe permesso di aggiornare una funzionalità della piattaforma Wordpress (sulla quale si appoggia il sito) e che nel 2014 si è scoperto essere diventata una porta di accesso per gli attacchi informatici



di Leonard Berberi

6 EUR WOULD
HAVE
STOPPED THE
BIGGEST
DATA LEAK

# "Così ho attaccato Hacking Team"

L'hacker sospettato di aver bucato l'azienda milanese riappare e pubblica un resoconto di come avrebbe fatto

# Hackers do care

The motivational side of system intrusion

"This is the beauty and asymmetry of hacking: just one people, working a hundred of hours, can dismantle years of work of a multimillionaire company. Hacking gives to underprivileged people the opportunity to fight and win".

#### Phineas Fisher / Hack Back

Author of the leak against the italian company "Hacking team", accused of selling cybersurveillance technologies to autoritarian regimes like Sud Corea, Kazakistan, Arabia Saudita, Oman, Libano, Mongolia, Sudan.

# Hackers do care

The motivational side of system intrusion

"My motivation was the quest for knowledge, the intellectual challenge, the thrill and also the escape from reality. (...) [with] a lot of the companies I targeted, to get the software was simply a trophy. I'd copy the code, store it on the computer and go right on to the next without even reading the code.".

Kevin Mitnick

# Hacking without a PC:

Blueboxing Lockpicking Shouldersurfing Social engineering On March 2, 2000, the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on the security of federal information systems. Kevin Mitnick, who has been called the most notorious hacker of all time, spoke before the committee:

"Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption, and secure access devices and it's money wasted because none of these measures address the weakest link in the security chain: the people who use, administer, operate and account for computer systems that contain protected information".

### Kevin Mitnick hearing to US Senate

"In my experience when I would try to get into these systems, the first line of attack would be what I call a social engineering attack, which really means trying to manipulate somebody over the phone through deception. And I was so successful in that line of attack that I rarely had to go toward a technical attack. (...)

I obtained confidential information in the same way government employees did. And I did it all without even touching a computer.

Let me emphasize for the committee the fact that these breaches of information security are ongoing, even as I stand before you today, and that agency employees are being manipulated using social engineering exploits, despite the current policies, procedures, guidelines and standards already in place at these

# The solution: Awareness & Knowledge

Kevin Mitnick hearing to US Senate (2000)

"I really have a firm belief that there has to be extensive training and education to educate the users and the people who administer and use these computer systems that they can be victims of manipulation over the telephone".

### Digital Divide - ISTAT Statistical data

Among families with at least one minor:

87% of families has a PC 89% has internet access

Among families with only aged people over 65:

17,8% of families has a PC

16,3% has internet access

http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/143073

How do we want to protect from computer fraud that 16% of families with elder people connected to the internet?

#### La ricchezza che nasce dalla conoscenza

- Investire in conoscenza e formazione

- Per trasformare il sud Italia in una Silicon Valley basta il valore della conoscenza

- Scommettere sull'eccellenza italiana informatica (FLOSS, Arduino, Security)

- Sostenere iniziative orientate alla promozione dell'IT Awareness

- Valorizzare (anche economicamente) le professionalita del settore IT