POST CRISIS REGULATORY STRATEGY: The Need for Pillar 4?

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WHY A MAJOR STRATEGIC REVIEW WAS NEEDED

- Fault lines in *status quo*
- Perversity: privatisation of profits / socialisation of costs
- Costs of crisis
- Tax-payer liability / insurer of last resort
- Massive moral hazard
- Distribution of costs: irrational burden sharing
- Endogeneity problem
- TBTF problem and moral hazard
- Inadequate Resolution arrangements
- Cross-border issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY New approach to Regulatory Regime

- Two key objectives: probability and cost
- More emphasis on Objective 2
- Endogeneity Problem
- Regulatory Matrix: trade-off
- Optimal regulation for Objective 1 indeterminate without Objective 2
- Primacy of equity capital: is it costly?
- No Resolution arrangements in place prior to crisis
- Holistic/strategic reform agenda
- Limit claim on tax-payer
- Full v. Partial Banking Union
- EU-wide resolution

TWO DIMENSIONS IN REFORM STRATEGY

 Reduce the probability of bank failures: Objective 1

- 2. Reduce the social cost of actual bank failures: Objective 2
 - tax-payers/system/other banks/customers/some debtholders
 - credibility of "no bail-outs"

INCOMPATIBLE TRINITY

- 1. Integrated cross-border banking markets with externalities
- 2. Global banking stability
- 3. Autonomous national regulation/supervision/resolution

Choose any two from three

RISK MIGRATION

"Risk migrates to where regulation is weakest, so there are natural limits to what regulatory strategies can reasonably achieve"

(Haldane et al, 2010)


QUOTATIONS

"[We plan] to manage the hell out of RWA" (Jamie Dimon, CEO of J P Morgan]

"We are scouring the balance sheet and looking for assets that could be structured differently so as to achieve lower risk weights".

BASEL II INCENTIVES

- Risk weights not reflect true risk: precision v. accuracy
- Remove assets from balance sheet
- Excess gearing
- Securitisation
- SIVs
- Credit risk shifting instruments and derivatives
- Higher risk
- Complexity and opaqueness



LOWERING THE COSTS OF BANK FAILURES

If social costs of bank failure were zero:

- No concern about probability of failures
- No tax-payer liability
- No bail-outs
- No moral hazard of bail-outs
- No need for regulation!

OBJECTIVE 1: REGULATION Less complexity

- Much higher equity ratios
- Enhanced loss-absorbing power: bail-ins / contingent capital / depositor preference
- Taxation of debt bias
- Leverage ratio
- Differential capital requirements: systemic risk
- Liquidity
- Living Wills: Recovery
- Macro prudential

COST ANALYSIS

- (1) Exaggerated: cost and availability of credit
 - (2) Social v. Private costs
 - (3) Sytemic benefit: cost-benefit analysis
 - (4) Consumer pays
 - (5) Stock-adjustment v. steady-state scenario
 - (6) Redress bias towards debt
 - (7) Stock-adjustment v. Steady-state
 - (8) Shareholder incentives

OBJECTIVE 2

- Credible Resolution arrangements: domestic and cross-border
- Ring-fencing
- Living Wills: Resolution
- Bond-holder losses
- Taxation

RING FENCING

Banking services that are critical to an economy are to be ring-fenced into legally, economically, and operationally separate subsidiaries

RING FENCING

- Simplified structure
- Advantages of synergies and economies of scale
- Capital can be shifted
- Advantages of diversity
- Ease of Resolution
- Ease of Separability: which to save
- No investment banking subsidy

TWO NEW INITIATIVES

1. EU Banking Union

2. Bank Resolution

FULL v. PARTIAL EU BANKING UNION

- Common regulation
- Unified supervision
- Single deposit insurance/protection
- Resolution fund
- Resolution authority
- Centralised decisions on resolution/closure regime
- Re-capitalisation decisions (?)
- Centralised management of bank crises
- Mutualisation of liabilities / risks

RATIONALE OF BANKING UNION

- Single market: avoid fragmentation of EU banking markets
- Integral part of a monetary union
- Remove bank supervision from political influence
- Lower forbearance
- Lower expectations of bail-outs and associated moral hazard
- Consistent supervision and enforcement
- Reduce regulatory arbitrage
- Protect against bank/sovereign NFBL
- Pool risks
- Equalise bank funding costs
- Lower country-specific risks

IMPLICATIONS OF BANKING UNION

- Major centralisation of sovereignty
- Sharing / pooling risks
- Sovereignty over bank closures
- Cross-border resolution arrangements
- Cross-border transfers
- Complex fiscal implications

EU RESOLUTION PLANS

- Harmonise key issues: powers / tools / legal authority / closure / authority to take early action
- Clearly-defined closure rules
- Adequate funding mechanisms for bank resolution: a Resolution Fund
- Harmonised resolution triggers
- Banks to have Living Wills
- Resolution plans for each bank
- Early intervention

THE TWO SHOULD BE LINKED

(1) Bank resolution arrangements an integral part of a Banking Union

(2) Incentive structures and conflicts

(3) Cross-border issues

CONSISTENCY AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES

Centralised supervision and responsibility for systemic stability with national deposit insurance and resolution arrangements are not incentive compatible:

- * national authorities could argue that they are forced to act because of supervisory failures by ECB
- * tax-payers resist paying for ECB errors
- national authorities have incentive to delay action to minimise own costs and keep bank alive though ECB liquidity
- * if ECB does not have resolution powers it may be forced to inject liquidity and keep zombie banks alive
- * ECB may have incentive to off-load the fiscal cost of problems to national authorities
- * conflict over when resolution is needed: ECB
- * ECB focus on EU systemic stability: not shared by national authorities
- * national authorities delay action and resist closures: especially of large banks / national champions

15 CORE PRINCIPLES

- 1. Two core objectives: probability of failure v. cost of failure
- 2. Systemic focus
- 3. Regulation by economic substance and systemic potential
- 4. TBTF addressed
- 5. Risks to remain private
- 6. Remove perversity: private profits v. social risk
- 7. Costs of failure borne by private stakeholders: equity and bonds
- 8. Limit claims on tax-payers

- 9. Early intervention: PCA and SEIR
- 10. Resolution arrangements
- 11. Moral hazard of intervention
- 12. Failure without disruption
- 13. Enhance market discipline
- 14. Supervision rather than regulation
- 15. International dimension

FUTURE STRATEGY

BASEL N or PILLAR 4?